ABSTRACT Chicago's CeaseFire program is an evidence-based public health approach to preventing gun violence. Baltimore is one of many US cities attempting to replicate the program. We compared changes in the number of homicide and nonfatal shooting incidents per month in four intervention neighborhoods with changes in high-crime comparison areas (police posts) without the intervention, while controlling for several measures of police activity and baseline levels of homicide and nonfatal shootings. In South Baltimore there were large program-related reductions in homicide and nonfatal shooting incidents. Among three East Baltimore program sites, the program was associated with a reduction of homicides in one area, a reduction in nonfatal shootings in another area, and a simultaneous increase in homicides and decrease in nonfatal shootings in another area. In some instances, program effects extended to neighborhoods bordering the intervention areas. Program-related reductions in homicides appear to be linked with conflict mediations conducted by program outreach workers.
masculinity and social status, but for future victimization. [7] [8] [9] These attitudes and perceptions pose a significant challenge to efforts to curtail urban gun violence.
Gun violence has historically been viewed as a problem to be addressed principally through policing and criminal justice responses. Although well-targeted and implemented law enforcement strategies designed to deter criminal gun possession and offending can reduce shootings, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] persistently high rates of gun violence and long-term costs of incarceration suggest a need for effective community-based prevention as well. Some public health researchers and practitioners have advocated for new approaches to violence prevention that draw upon lessons learned from successful public health initiatives. 16 Drawing upon his knowledge and experience combating infectious diseases, Gary Slutkin developed CeaseFire-a public health program to prevent shootings involving youth by changing behaviors, attitudes, and social norms most directly related to gun violence. The program targets communities with high rates of gun violence and often contracts with community-based organizations that are best positioned to work with high-risk youth in those areas. Street outreach workers identify and build trusting relationships with youth ages 14 to 25 years who are at greatest risk of being involved in gun violence. By serving as positive role models and connecting youth to educational and job opportunities, outreach workers direct high-risk youth toward paths away from violence. Outreach staff typically work during evening hours, when most shootings occur, and position themselves so they can mediate conflicts that have the potential to lead to shootings. Some outreach staff take on roles as "violence interrupters" and devote all or nearly all of their time to identifying and mediating conflicts between individuals or gangs. The program also attempts to mobilize communities by holding monthly events designed to bring the community together, promote nonviolence, and provide positive activities for youth. 17 An evaluation of CeaseFire in Chicago found that the program was associated with significant reductions in shootings and retaliatory homicides in four of seven intervention neighborhoods studied. 18 When program implementation was interrupted as a result of funding cuts, shootings increased in the affected areas. 19 A recent evaluation of a similar program in Pittsburgh, however, found no evidence that the program reduced violence, 20 
RESEARCH METHODS

Data and Measures
Because Safe Streets was focused on reducing gun violence, the primary outcomes of interest were homicides and nonfatal shootings (NFS). We obtained data on these outcomes from the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to create monthly panel datasets for both homicides and NFS incidents for 39 police posts in Baltimore for the period January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2010. We used the number of homicide and NFS incidents as outcome measures rather than the number of victims because single incidents with a very large number of victims can skew the data and estimates of program impact. Safe Streets was designed to be implemented within the boundaries of a police post (precinct) and eligibility required that the post was in the top quartile for number of homicides and nonfatal shootings during the 3 years prior to the program's launch. Therefore, we focused the study on the 39 police posts that were either in the top quartile for gun violence during the pre-intervention period or bordered a Safe Streets post. Figure 1 Gun violence can spread similarly to an infectious disease, 22 and efforts to prevent gun violence could, therefore, reduce the spread of gun violence to areas adjacent to the intervention sites. Also, program participants and others exposed to the program cross boundaries of adjacent neighborhoods. Program effects on police posts bordering the program sites were estimated in the same way that we measured direct program exposure, with variables indicating whether or not Safe Streets was implemented in an adjacent post.
Data Analysis
Program effects were estimated using negative binomial regression appropriate for modeling outcomes represented as incident counts and preferred to Poisson regression when the data exhibit overdisperion. 23 Regression inference was based 
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on generalized estimating equations to adjust effect standard errors to account for the clustering of the data by police post. 24 These models estimate program effects by contrasting changes in the gun violence target communities with changes in communities that did not have the program, while controlling for baseline levels of gun violence and targeted law enforcement activities directed at controlling violence in specific neighborhoods. Specifically, the regression models included indicator variables for the presence of BPD's Violent Crime Impact Section, specialized detective units deployed to areas with some of the highest rates of gun violence to suppress illegal gun carrying and gun violence. Similar efforts have been shown to reduce violence in other high-crime urban areas. 10 The models also controlled for the effects of Project Exile offender notification meetings. Project Exile targets offenders in high-crime areas who are deemed to be the most dangerous. Offenders are called in and warned by law enforcement officials that they will face federal prosecution and the likelihood of much longer prison sentences if they reoffend. Offenders are also offered services and support to help them avoid reoffending. Finally, the models controlled for the number of arrests for drug and weapons (possession only) offenses in the previous month in each post. Using the number of weapons and drug arrests in the previous month avoids problems of endogeneity. 25 The regression models controlled for pre-intervention differences in levels of homicides and NFS for each post by using an indicator variable for each post. We controlled for changes in unmeasured determinants of gun violence operating in Baltimore's most violent neighborhoods with indicator variables for year. Because there are seasonal fluctuations in gun violence, we also controlled for calendar month with a set of indicator variables for each month with January as the reference. Regression coefficients were exponentiated (e β ) to permit interpretation as adjusted incident rate ratios (IRR) and percent changes associated with the program.
Although the standard errors of regression coefficients were adjusted to account for the lack of independence and clustering of the data by police post, spatial autocorrelation of model residuals could still bias standard errors and tests of statistical significance. We used Moran's I statistic, a common test of spatial autocorrelation, to test whether model residuals for each year and month were spatially correlated. 26 There was little evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the model residuals. Table 2 (Figure 3) . Madison-Eastend's brief intervention period was marked by an early spike in gun violence followed by a decline that continued after the intervention period (Figure 4) . The clearest program-related reduction in gun violence is evident in Cherry Hill ( Figure 5 ).
RESULTS
Estimates of program effects from the regression models are presented in Table 3 . Program effects were most consistent across outcomes for Cherry Hill where the program was associated with a 56 % reduction in homicide incidents (IRR=0.44, pG0.001) and a 34 % reduction in NFS incidents (IRR=0.66, pG0.001). When homicide and NFS events are summed into a single outcome measure, Cherry Hill's Safe Streets program was associated with a 45 % decrease in this outcome (IRR= 0.55, pG0.001).
Program effects at the three sites in East Baltimore were more varied (Table 3) Safe Streets in McElderry Park was associated with a 10 % reduction in homicide incidents that was not statistically significant, and a 15 % increase in NFS incidents that approached statistical significance (p=0.064). Safe Streets in Ellwood Park was associated with no statistically significant change in homicide incidents and a 34 % reduction in NFS (IRR=0.66, pG0.001). Homicide incidents in Madison-Eastend during the 18 months of full implementation were estimated to be 2.7 times higher than would have been anticipated without the intervention (IRR=2.70, pG0.001 ), yet the program was associated with a 44 % decrease in NFS (IRR=0.56, pG0.001). When homicide and NFS incidents were Estimates of program effects on bordering neighborhoods were similar to the effects in the intervention neighborhoods. Police posts bordering Cherry Hill experienced beneficial spill-over effects on homicide incidents (IRR=0.52, pG 0.001). Estimates for program effects on posts bordering Ellwood Park suggest detrimental spill-over for homicide incidents (IRR=1.55, p=0.005); however, these effects were counterbalanced by Ellwood Park's program's beneficial effects on NFS in its border posts (IRR=0.48, p=0.030) .
Across all the program sites and border posts, these statistically significant estimates of Safe Streets' impact, both negative and positive, translate into 5.4 fewer homicide incidents (2.8 in the intervention areas and 2.6 in the border areas) and 34.6 fewer nonfatal shooting incidents (17.1 in the intervention areas and 17.5 in the border areas) during 112 cumulative months of intervention post observations. There would have been more than 10 additional homicide incidents prevented had there not been significant increases associated with program implementation in Madison-Eastend and in the area bordering Ellwood Park.
Deployment of BPD's Violent Crime Impact Section was associated with a 16 % reduction in the measure of homicide plus NFS incidents (IRR=0.84, p=0.027). The Project Exile call-in in Northwest Baltimore was linked with reductions of 44 % for NFS (IRR=0.56, pG0.001) and 35 % for homicide plus NFS incidents (IRR=0.65, pG0.001); however, there were no statistically significant effects associated with the call-in that occurred in West Baltimore. One-month-lagged measures of arrests for the possession or distribution of illegal drugs and for arrests for illegal possession of weapons were not predictive of the number of homicide or NFS incidents within a police post. Estimates for year fixed effects reveal a downward shift in NFS incidents broadly beginning in 2008-a year when many gun-offender-focused law enforcement efforts were initiated or ramped up-that intensified through 2010 (Table 3) .
Although we controlled for baseline differences in the gun violence outcome measures as well as for variations in arrests for weapons and drugs, baseline differences between some intervention areas and the comparison posts led us to examine the sensitivity of our estimates of program effects to the inclusion of lowerrisk comparison posts. When we repeated our analysis with only the 10 comparison posts with the highest numbers of homicide and NFS incidents during the preintervention period, the estimates of program effect were very similar to the estimates produced when all 29 nonintervention comparison posts in the top quartile of homicides plus nonfatal shooting incidents were used.
DISCUSSION
Although estimates of program effect varied, three of the four intervention neighborhoods experienced relatively large program-related reductions in at least one measure of gun violence without also having a statistically significant increase in another measure of gun violence. Consistent with the notion that gun violence often spreads like a social contagion, 22 we found significant program-related reductions in gun violence in areas bordering Safe Streets sites. Our analyses indicate that the program was associated with the prevention of about 35 nonfatal shootings and at least five homicides across 112 cumulative months of program implementation across the four sites. These reductions were accomplished in some of Baltimore's most violent neighborhoods and were evident soon after program implementation. Implementation data suggest that the frequency of conflict mediations may at least partially explain variation in program effects on homicides. The two sites with large reductions in homicides had about three times as many conflict mediations as the other two sites, and the 22-month period without a homicide in McElderry Park occurred when Safe Streets' outreach workers conducted 16 mediations-many involving large numbers of gang members-within the first 4 months of full program implementation. Cherry Hill's program may have also benefited from having to contend with little violence caused by outsiders because it is geographically isolated from most of the rest of the city.
The only program site where there was no evidence of a beneficial program impact on gun violence, Madison-Eastend, experienced a large spike in homicides not long after Safe Streets was implemented while simultaneously experiencing a 44 % decline in NFS incidents. These estimates of program impact may be less reliable than the other estimates because there were only 18 months of full program operation in that location. We believe it is unlikely that program activities spurred more homicides in Madison-Eastend. One possible reason for the positive association between the program and homicides is that the conditions which led the city to decide to implement the program in this neighborhood at the time (e.g., increased gang activity) may have heightened by the time the program was actually put into place. In fact, Baltimore police reported that there was an intense feud between drug-selling gangs during the intervention period in Madison-Eastend and surrounding areas. The feud allegedly involved abductions of gang leaders' family and murders, and peaked on July 27, 2009 when 18 people were shot in a single day, 12 at an incident in Madison-Eastend. 27 The low number of mediations performed in Madison-Eastend and nearby Ellwood Park might reflect some gangs' unwillingness to consider nonviolent alternatives to settling their grievances during the heightened tension at that time.
Safe Streets faced challenges in Ellwood Park and Madison-Eastend in addition to the intense gang feud. Unlike Cherry Hill and McElderry Park, these communities lacked strong neighborhood organizations to support the program and a program office within the neighborhood because they worked from a Safe Streets office in nearby McElderry Park. The three sites in East Baltimore also differed from Cherry Hill in that they shared a site director, outreach supervisor, and community coordinator.
McElderry Park was the only intervention neighborhood which did not experience a program-related reduction in NFS. It also had 60 % more illegal weapon arrests during the pre-intervention study period than the other neighborhoods studied. If the higher number of weapon arrests in McElderry Park reflects a greater propensity to keep and carry firearms compared to other neighborhoods, this may have limited the program's effectiveness in reducing NFS that result from spontaneous altercations involving one or more individuals.
As with any non-experimental study, our estimates of program effect could be biased by unmeasured factors that were related to the place and time of program implementation as well as to gun violence. We sought to minimize any such potential biases by limiting our study to police posts which were in the 75th to 100th percentile for the number of homicides and nonfatal shootings, a prerequisite to being eligible to compete for funds to implement the program. Although intervention areas had somewhat higher rates of gun violence prior to Safe Streets, the analyses control for baseline differences in gun violence and estimates of program impact were consistent with those produced with all comparison areas. Our analyses also control for conditions other than Safe Streets that seem most likely to explain changes in gun violence within the intervention areas during the study period-the implementation of key law enforcement initiatives intended to curb gun violence that were focused on discrete areas, and arrests for weapon and drugrelated offenses yearly shifts in gun violence not attributable to these public safety measures, and calendar month.
Selection bias can skew estimates of program effects if the program is only implemented in neighborhoods with exceptional capacity and motivation to address gun violence (because they are the most competitive in the open bidding process for program funds). However, while the organizations selected in the open competition for funding demonstrated the strongest capacity for implementing a program of this type, three of the four neighborhood locations for the program were selected more on the basis of need than for the community's capacity. The organization which ran the program in McElderry Park, Ellwood Park, and Madison-Eastend had worked in East Baltimore, but not worked in these specific neighborhoods prior to Safe Streets. They were asked to work in these neighborhoods by city officials primarily because those neighborhoods were considered to be in greatest need of the program.
Although both the prior study of CeaseFire's effects in Chicago and this study of Safe Streets in Baltimore provide evidence that the program prevented gun violence, the magnitude and consistency of the effects vary and some program sites did not experience program-related reductions in gun violence. Our findings from Baltimore suggest that strength of program implementation, especially with respect to conflict mediations, is likely to explain differences in program effects. Given the threat that gun violence poses to the safety, health, and prosperity of urban communities and the growing popularity of Chicago's CeaseFire approach, more research is needed both on the relationship between program implementation and effects on violence.
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